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This article considers the current status of police reform and
the many problems associated with it. It argues that the current
proposals are very largely producer-driven rather than
consumer-led and if implemented would serve to undermine
the Prime Minister’s policy commitment to both public service
reform and the encouragement of greater consumer choice.
Recent public opinion polls indicate that consumer perceptions
of police amalgamations are almost wholly negative. It is also
argued that the criteria for determination of ‘stand-alone’
forces set by the Home Office has proven to be highly arbitrary.
It argues for the need for more effective collaboration between
forces and for much closer local authority involvement in the
delivery of local police services. It highlights possible local
government reform proposals within the forthcoming White
Paper and the need to link reform of local government structures
with those of police forces. It concludes with an evaluation of
neighbourhood policing strategy and the need for joint responsi-
bility and oversight between police and local authority to both
anchor and sustain this important initiative.
Introduction
In his speech to the Police Federation at Bournemouth the new
Home Secretary was to indicate that the commitment to speedy
implementation of police reform would itself be reviewed with
an expectation that plans for mergers of police forces could be
delayed by at least a year (Cowan & Dodd, 2006). John Reid’s
Bournemouth statement was to be followed in June 2006 by a
further statement to the House of Commons that forced mergers
of police forces would not be set in motion before the summer
recess, effectively delaying any implementation until the autumn
of that year (Jones, 2006). These decisions cannot be interpreted
as suggesting the effective end of the amalgamation programme.
They do serve, however, to provide an opportunity for further
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reflection on what future structure might improve police efficiency
and effectiveness. This opportunity has in effect been denied to
police forces and police authorities over the last six months.
This has indeed been to date a ‘planning process’ whose
timescale dictated by the Home Secretary has been utterly
unreasonable and one also within which all meaningful ‘options’
to amalgamation identified within the 2005 HMIC Report, Clos-
ing the Gap (i.e. collaboration, federation and identification of
‘crime markets’) have been closed down by the Home Secretary
before any real debate or discussion could be undertaken con-
cerning them. The fact that police authorities and forces have
been largely confronted with a ‘no option’ agenda has also meant
that alternatives that may be more effective than police force
mergers have not been explored even though, in the original
2005 Report, HMIC considered it right and appropriate to raise
these options (HMIC, 2005: 15–16).
This article seeks to initiate the exploration of alternatives to
police force amalgamation and to also explore further a number
of issues raised within the Policy Exchange Report on Restruc-
turing Policing in England and Wales (Policy Exchange, 2006).
It is argued that the speed of the amalgamation planning process
to date has meant that both public and professional opinion have
been largely ignored or not consulted as the then Home Secre-
tary’s conclusions were in effect predetermined and subse-
quently not amenable to rational debate and discussion.
This might be considered unfortunate as the HMIC 2005
Report upon which the Home Secretary was to buttress his plans
for mergers was also to highlight matters concerning the need to:
(a) Identify the significance of criminal markets in determin-
ing police force boundaries;
(b) Be aware of geography where the scale and demography
might require a measure of pragmatism in proposals for
change;
(c) Recognise that coterminosity would make it essential to
consider established political and partner boundaries;
(d) Accept that (local) Identity and natural boundaries
should be maximised where possible. (HMIC, 2005:
13–14)
Although each of these issues were to be factored in to the
HMIC 2005 Report, it is fair to say that none of them was
reflected in the plans outlined by the Home Secretary in identify-
ing what was seen as merely stage 1 of the process of police
force mergers.
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Public and Professional Opinion
Public opinion data will not be considered in detail here. It is
sufficient to note that recent opinion poll survey evidence
conducted by Policy Exchange (May 2006) has demonstrated
that the majority of the public remain opposed to police mergers
and that this opposition grows when members of the public learn
that their local police force forms part of the merger plan (Policy
Exchange, 2006). To this must be added the evident difference of
opinion held by professional police officers as to the advantages
(or not) of further police mergers. Just prior to being appointed
to the Presidency of ACPO, Ken Jones was to argue that he
could see a future where:
Services will be provided at the level where they are best
organised and delivered. Therefore most forces and police
authorities in this suggested model (of federation) remain the
best structures to continue to develop local policing along
with the current governance and accountability mechanisms.
(Jones, 2005)
It was this chief officers’ view that the implementation of
‘unwise amalgamations’ would put at risk much of what had
been achieved in relation to local policing. He was to state that
he strongly argued for the retention of most forces and their
identities ‘as they now are’ (Jones, 2005: 25).
A not dissimilar viewpoint was to be expressed earlier by a
former chief constable who was to note, in 2001, that one of the
most remarkable features of current and previous arguments in
favour of amalgamation of forces was based almost solely on
police force size. As O’Byrne (2001) was to argue in relation to
this, the determination of police efficiency on the basis of size
has provided a regular ‘upwardly moving target’ as the establish-
ment numbers deemed necessary have steadily risen over the
years. O’Byrne notes that:
The usual approach is the simple one of determining a
number below which forces are not felt to be sustainable.
This is difficult to prove in empirical terms and is usually
done as a matter of judgement (however that is defined) by
some person or organisation on which the government places
reliance ie HMIC. (O’Byrne, 2001: 127)
This former chief officer goes on to note, however, that in the
early 1990s the figure fixed upon by HMIC was 3,500. HMIC
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was to argue that this was the ideal size for a police force. But
very little if any empirical work was conducted by HMIC to
sustain this claim. Indeed what research was conducted used
very crude measurements in relation to cost per officer per head
of population, the overall crime rate and crime detection rates.
He asserts these did not compare like with like and were not
good indicators of overall efficiency or cost effectiveness either
(O’Byrne, 2001: 127).
The highly simplistic indicators used by HMIC made no
allowance for calls on police, for example, in high areas of social
deprivation and high density housing ‘which are always sig-
nificantly higher’ than in other areas (O’Byrne, 2001: 127). It is
sufficient to note, on the basis of O’Byrne’s evaluation, that
previous analyses provided by HMIC to justify larger police
forces through mergers have proved in the past to be as meth-
odologically suspect and unsound as the current analysis is now
considered to be by its many critics.
Arbitrary Determination of Police Force Stand-Alone
Status
Prior to his departure the then Home Secretary, Charles Clarke,
was to identify some police forces as being sufficiently ‘fit for
purpose’ to stand alone as a ‘strategic police force’, One of these
forces proved to be Kent Constabulary (the others being Hamp-
shire and Greater Manchester). It would be invidious to chal-
lenge the strengths exhibited by this force particularly in
providing ‘protective services’. It is the case that the accident of
events may well have provided a further defence for Kent
constabulary’s determination to fight against a merger with other
southern forces.
Thus the incident arising from the Securitas robbery near
Tonbridge in Kent was to prove propitious for the police force.
This was clearly felt to be the case by the Chair of the Police
Authority who, after a meeting with the Home Secretary, was to
comment that the Securitas raid and the force’s reaction to it had
proved to be the ‘icing on the cake’ in helping to influence the
‘Stand-Alone’ status accorded to Kent Police (Boyes, 2006).
It was also noticeable, however, that in a letter from the
Chief Constable of Kent to Police Review concerning the same
Securitas robbery and his police force’s response to it, this
officer claimed to be very much aware of the collaborative nature
of the police response to the incident which contributed to its
successful resolution. This officer, later, expressed his:
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Personal thanks to all those police forces and national police
agencies who have assisted us in our investigation into the
robbery and kidnapping at the Securitas Depot. I have been
heartened by the offers of support and cooperation received
and this has undoubtedly helped us make substantial progress
in the investigation at an early stage. (Fuller, 2006: 15)
While the Home Secretary therefore was to comment, in relation
to the Securitas robbery, that it was its ability to provide
protective services that had persuaded the Home Office and
HMIC that Kent was ‘fit for purpose’, the reality appeared to be
that the incident in fact only provided additional evidence of the
strength and utility of existing police collaborative arrangements
(Fuller, 2006). There must also be some basis for concluding that
should the Securitas raid have occurred in a neighbouring police
force area ,the collaborative arrangements set in train might well
have been rewarded with a similar success.
The Need for Increased Police Collaboration
The commitment to more effective policing of Level 2 crime
which permeates the 2005 HMIC Report and serves as a major
justification for merging police forces now sits uneasily with
recent developments in the police criminal investigation field.
These relate to the creation and recent activation of the Serious
and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) which the Government
has established to deal more effectively with organised crime.
The SOCA has also dramatically changed the policing land-
scape, not least by effectively bringing to an end the operations
of both the National Crime Squad and the National Criminal
Intelligence Service.
It is now estimated that the majority of police officers
serving with these bodies, some 2,000 specialist CID officers,
have voluntarily opted to join SOCA (Metropolitan Police,
interview with OCU Commander, May 2006). These officers by
joining SOCA have ceased to be police officers and are now
employees of SOCA. It is significant that these officers are
expected to deal overwhelmingly with Level 3 crime (inter-
national –organised) rather than Level 2 crime. The sudden
departure of so many officers may therefore have helped in fact
to ‘widen the gap’ in relation to level 2 crime (Metropolitan
Police, interview with OCU Commander, May 2006).
The professional response to both this development and
others has been to resurrect actively ‘regional crime squads’ to
plug the growing gap in this area of policing. In Wales a regional
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crime squad has recently been established; in the West Midlands
a regional crime squad has been operational for some two years.
These squads do not appear to have incapacitated member police
forces in dealing effectively with Level 2 crime. With the
significant loss of national crime services to SOCA they may
also prove to be the most cost-efficient and professionally
effective response to Level 2 crime. One chief officer has
recently argued, in the absence of an Anti-Terrorist Agency, for
the creation of regional special branch services that could work
alongside newly re-established regional crime squads (Chief
Constable of Hampshire, interview, May 2006).
These developments indicate that earlier arguments made by
Policy Exchange in relation to the use of regional structures as
an alternative to police mergers using evidence presented by
former chief officers are entirely vindicated. They provide fur-
ther evidence of effective collaboration which in fact continues
to characterise contemporary policing in England and Wales.
The Case for Effective Local Authority Linkages
As evidenced within the 2005 Report, HMIC are aware of the
need to sustain effective local authority relationships. This was
most recently reinforced by the then Home Secretary’s demand
made at the Birmingham ACPO 2005 Conference that local
police boundaries should be coterminous with those of the local
authority. It is the case, however, that the subsequent pressure to
regionalise police forces would serve to undermine this objec-
tive. This is because the enlarged regional force boundaries
would cease to correspond with any existing local authority
boundaries.
Yet the need for both coterminous boundaries and a local
government input into policing has been identified as an essential
component of effective policing. This was to be identified some
years ago in the Morgan Report on Safer Communities that
recommended partnerships between police and local authorities
(Home Office, 1991). Elsewhere professional police associations
have acknowledged the importance of coterminous boundaries
with local authorities. The Police Superintendents’ Association
of England and Wales has argued that the single most significant
determinant of effective policing is the creation of coterminous
boundaries with the local authority (Police Superintendents’
Association, 2004).
The crucial nature of the link between police unit and local
authority has been noted by a former chief officer. He has argued
in relation to the Basic Command Unit (BCU), for example, that:
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In my experience policing works best where there is a clear
link between the BCU and the local political unit. (O’Byrne,
2001: 136)
He also notes that:
The shape of local government is critical to the successful
reorganisation of the police service. Unless there is to be a
massive democratic deficit it is essential that the police are so
structured that it has a clear relationship with local govern-
ment. To establish a regional police force without a regional
government that was underpinned by large unitary authorities
would be to create a national force with little in the way of
local accountability. (O’Byrne, 2001: 136)
The same chief officer adds that it is also essential if the
accountability is to be real and not cosmetic ‘that the local
government unit has some ability to shape the style and content
of local policing’ (O’Byrne, 2001: 137).
Local Government Reform Plans
It was to be argued within HMIC’s 2005 Report that no plans for
local government reorganisation appeared to be on the horizon
and that consequently there was a need for the police to act
unilaterally in reforming their boundaries (HMIC, 2005). Yet,
some time prior to its publication, press reports in early 2005 were
to suggest that the Office of Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) was
actively considering local government reorganisation. Further-
more the reform plans were predicated on the probable abolition
of two-tier county and district councils and the creation of
unitary authorities to replace them (Loveday, 2005).
Subsequently it was to be discovered that ODPM, and
latterly the Department of Communities and Local Government,
was actively involved in assessing potential local government
reform and that its proposals would be outlined within a White
Paper in the summer of 2006. While it is as yet uncertain as to
what precise form its recommendations will take, there is some
expectation that the two-tier divide between county and district
might be replaced by a unitary system. If so, this will only
complete the programme of local reform based on unitary bodies
initiated in the early 1990s by the Conservative Government that
was to lead to the creation of 48 unitary councils in England and
Wales. It was to involve the abolition of four counties - those of
Avon, Cleveland, Humberside and Berkshire and the creation
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within them of a number of unitary authorities (Wilson & Game,
1998: 59).
Although there is an expectation that reform will embrace
unitary structures, there is a clear need for alternative structures.
Among these and highlighted within HMIC’s 2005 Report is the
concept of the ‘city-region’. This is by no means new and can be
traced back to the Royal Commission of 1969 within which, in a
Memorandum of Dissent, Derek Senior was to advocate a multi-
tier system of provincial councils, city regions, district and local
councils (Wilson & Game, 1998: 50).
The reappearance of the city-region concept is of some
importance if only because in terms of policing reform this
structure could easily encompass the concept of the local crime
market, initially highlighted but subsequently ignored within
HMIC’s 2005 Report Closing the Gap’ The importance of the
criminal market concept is that it requires those who aim to
restructure police forces to look closely at areas of demand and
to link crime markets to local hinterlands.
It is arguably the case that one of the greatest weaknesses of
the local government reforms of 1974 (other than the creation of
two-tier authorities) was, in policing terms, to remove criminal
markets from their hinterlands by the creation of artificial
divisions that separated these. A clear example was to be
provided in the West Midlands where the crime market of
Coventry was removed from its hinterland as Coventry became a
police division of the West Midlands police force while the
hinterland remained in Warwickshire. A similar artificial divide
was to occur with the removal of Wolverhampton from its
hinterland by its location within the West Midlands police force
area rather than Staffordshire.
Similar problems of the removal of the crime market from its
hinterland could be discovered within each of the metropolitan
areas. It is sufficient to note that the city-region concept would
allow planners to re-address this issue in the interests of improv-
ing police efficiency and effectiveness. This would involve the
disaggregation of some police forces rather than their further
expansion but might actually improve their overall effectiveness
if police boundaries are more closely tied to local demands on
police services.
Local crime markets provide a police management rationale
for restructuring. It is also the case that the city-region and crime
market would also encourage the creation of police forces that
are much closer to local communities than currently obtains and
that could be expected to cease altogether within the planned
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‘regionalisation’ now pursued by the Home Office. Interestingly,
in Scotland it has been recently been revealed that the need to
improve local community links is currently encouraging the
break-up of Strathclyde Police Force, which is now seen as being
too big to sustain such links (Booker, 2006). There may indeed
be a similar case for challenging the traditional Home Office
shibboleth by arguing not that there are too many police forces
within England and Wales but that there are in fact too few.
The concept of the city-region within, for example, Cleve-
land could have a number of attractions. The existence of unitary
authorities would provide the platform for more effective service
delivery and greater local accountability through the BCU struc-
ture. It is clear that ODPM et al. are currently interested in
improving accountability and governance structures at this level
along with establishing mechanisms that would encourage more
effective crime reduction partnerships.
At one level above that of unitary authorities the police
authority would exercise a more strategic role as highlighted in a
2004 Report produced jointly by the Home Office and Strategy
Unit. In assessing a future role of the police authority this Report
was to argue that:
Greater emphasis should be placed on their strategic and
challenge role, their role in consultation on force wide
themes and on championing collaboration between forces.
(Home Office/PM Strategy Unit Report, 2004: para 46)
Identifying the Basis for Effective Police Reform
The evidence presented here provides a basis for a degree of
reorganisation of policing to respond to local government
reform. It also acknowledges the professional judgement of
HMIC in relation to the significance of crime markets et al.
outlined within its 2005 Report. Much can be accomplished to
improve police effectiveness without a move to regional struc-
tures. Regionalisation as currently propounded within the Home
Office is likely to prove to be an expensive irrelevance. Addi-
tionally, with costs of £500–£600 million predicted by ACPO,
this can also be expected to undermine fatally the roll-out of
Neighbourhood Policing (Policy Exchange, 2006: 20). Yet the
neighbourhood policing strategy will itself involve high man-
power costs and resource investment if it is to come anywhere
near to fulfilling its planned role. Ironically an under-funded,
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neighbourhood policing strategy would nevertheless continue to
provide the basis and ultimate defence for merging police forces
(Loveday, 2005).
There is a clear case for further and deeper evaluation of
policing needs in the twenty-first century than that attempted to
date by either HMIC or the Home Office. This would need to
encompass the concept of tiered policing within which functional
specialisation is given greater weight. It would also recognise the
obvious black holes in the current structure that have not been
addressed by the creation of SOCA.
This would relate most immediately to the evident need for
an Anti-Terrorist Agency to be established on a national basis.
Given events in July 2005, it might be thought remarkable that a
huge investment has been made in SOCA but no corresponding
investment has been directed to what many might consider a
more immediate threat. Given the disappearance off the police
radar screen of over 2,000 trained detectives to SOCA, there is
now also a need to resuscitate Regional Crime Squads to fill the
evident vacuum created by SOCA. This form of collaboration
could prove to be much more welcome to the public, police
forces and police authorities than the expensive alternative of
amalgamations along with the uncertainty of outcomes asso-
ciated with that development.
Limited police reorganisation linked to local government
reform would allow for the roll-out of both neighbourhood
policing and workforce modernisation. The latter represents a far
more important trajectory in terms of police reform than simplis-
tic and ultimately highly costly police force mergers. Based on
unitary authorities and city–regions, local government reform
would also provide a much sounder and more long-term basis for
the restructuring of policing than any unilateral reform embarked
upon through enlarging police force boundaries.
Where unitary authority boundaries are linked to BCU
boundaries there is a strong likelihood of improving partnership
arrangements within local Crime Reduction Partnerships. Local
community involvement and more effective accountability
mechanisms can be expected to improve local police effective-
ness. Force-wide responsibilities would fall to the local police
authority and these would embrace collaborative arrangements in
terms of service delivery I/T and purchasing systems to improve
cost-effectiveness. To date this structure has been barely subject
to any evaluation by the Home Office. Yet it continues to offer
potentially the most effective and attractive alternative to the
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creation of distant and expensive police bureaucracies that
regional police mergers would inevitably generate.
Drivers for Change: A Need for Local Oversight of Police
Service Delivery
To date it could be argued that the parameters and framework of
police reform have been very largely ‘producer’- rather than
‘consumer’-driven. It is the case that along with HMIC a number
of senior members of ACPO have pushed very strongly for the
amalgamation programme. Their arguments (if not the evidence)
have proved to be highly influential. It is the case, however, that
‘producer’ interest in the creation of ever larger police forces
also flies in the face of current government commitment to
public service reform within which consumer interests are given
a much greater salience.
The evidence to date suggests that if police reform takes
shape as identified within the HMIC blueprint, then producer
rather than consumer interests will have proved to have been
once more overwhelming in determining the shape and nature of
public service delivery. This would appear to be the very
opposite of what is intended within the Prime Minister’s public
service modernisation programme.
There are, however, other factors that clearly question the
utility of future police service delivery strategies. One of these
relates to the question of police governance, particularly in
relation to the delivery and oversight of Neighbourhood Policing
Strategy. The absence of any detailed consideration of police
governance within the original HMIC Report Closing the Gap
(2005) was, of course, to be the subject of immediate comment
at the time (Loveday, 2005).
It remains the case, however, that at its most local level the
reform programme also appears to exhibit significant limitations
in relation to the matter of governance. This problem has been
most recently highlighted by the ACPO lead officer on neigh-
bourhood policing. He has argued that while the government is
committed to increasing democratic involvement in policing, this
aim cannot impinge on the ability of police to make ‘independent
operational judgements’ and that the police national intelligence
model would be expected to provide major guidance in the deliv-
ery of neighbourhood policing strategy (Baggot, 22: 2006).
The same ACPO lead officer has also raised doubts as to the
utility of local authority scrutiny committee powers. These are
expected, as identified within the Police and Justice Bill 2006, to
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oversee the roll-out and implementation of neighbourhood polic-
ing strategy. He has argued for example that:
Over time we hope that the new powers given to local
committees will effectively become redundant. Once neigh-
bourhood policing is implemented in all areas and if local
authorities and the police work well together we hope that
the public will not need recourse to the proposed scrutiny
committees. (Baggott, 17: 2005).
The police expectation that there will be no need for an ongoing
scrutiny role for neighbourhood policing would appear to chal-
lenge the government’s own plans to encourage much greater
public involvement in the determination of priorities for local
policing (and other) services. In doing so it may also once again
serve to highlight the ‘producer’-led nature of the police reform
programme as envisaged by those chief police officers who
remain most overtly committed to it.
Yet experience suggests that there is always likely to be a
need to provide a platform for local participation and that local
authority involvement encouraged by a local scrutiny committee
will go some way to achieving this. There may also be a further
justification for such local authority involvement. This relates to
the long-term pressure of future police abstractions (where
operational officers are removed to deal with more immediate
demands or major incidents) to which neighbourhood policing, a
high manpower investment, can expect inevitably to be subject.
Some evidence of just how great those demands can prove to
be has ironically been provided by the same ACPO lead officer
on neighbourhood policing. In his assessment of the introduction
of neighbourhood policing within his own force area he com-
mented that it was to take over a year to get the police
abstraction rate in the area piloting neighbourhood policing
strategy down from 40% to 10%. This reduction had moreover
only been achieved in the pilot area as a result of significant
intervention from senior management within his force (Baggott,
2006: 21). This suggests that the likely impact of demands
arising from police abstractions could deal a fatal blow at any
time to neighbourhood policing strategy in the absence of local
authority intervention (or protection).
Arguably one central role of a scrutiny committee (or any
other oversight body) could be therefore to act as an important
anchor for this police strategy and to provide a counterweight to
the inevitable police abstraction pressures to which this strategy
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(and local neighbourhood policing teams) is likely, on past
experience, to be subject. One further case for local authority
participation and joint determination of neighbourhood policing
strategy relates to the recent history of numerous fresh policing
initiatives and strategies that have been launched over recent
years by police forces (Policing by Objectives; Problem-
Orientated Policing; Total Geographic Policing, etc..).
The graveyard of earlier police strategies might suggest that,
in the absence of strong local authority involvement, neighbour-
hood policing strategy could within a relatively short time-scale
go the same way as the rest. This is made more likely within a
police organisational culture that has traditionally accorded new
policing initiatives a very short shelf–life (Loveday, 2005). All
of this might suggest the need for greater rather than less local
authority participation in local neighbourhood policing. This
strategy would in effect cease to be the monopoly of the police
force and become one that would be made a joint responsibility
of both police and local government.
Conclusion
The Home Secretary’s most recent statement to the House of
Commons (and letter to Chief Police Officers) suggests the need
for further discussion on police reform prior to implementation.
This now provides an opportunity to assess properly all the
alternative forms that such reform might take. These could, in the
long term, provide much more imaginative platforms for police
service modernisation than a producer-led and highly bureaucratic
amalgamation process. This, when assessed by the yardstick of
earlier experience of police reorganisation in the 1970s, is
unlikely, in the long term, to improve very much at all.
Alternative strategies would encompass a possible disag-
gregation of police forces to ensure that police forces were
clearly aligned to local crime markets and hinterland. They
would also recognise the proven value and success of police
collaboration in the past and the potentially extremely high costs
associated with police amalgamations. This would only divert
police resources away from front-line service provision at the
very time that Neighbourhood Policing Strategy can be expected
to make considerable demands on increasingly limited police
resources. Alternative strategies would also explore current part-
nership arrangements and the need to establish more effective
delivery mechanisms in terms of both local policing and crime
reduction strategy.
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As the government’s recent National Community Safety
Strategy has highlighted, there is much that requires to be
accomplished before effective delivery of community safety
becomes a reality at local authority level. The hiatus accorded to
the police reform programme by the new Home Secretary will at
least allow for a more complete evaluation of alternatives in
matching police service with current need than was ever pro-
posed by his predecessor, Charles Clarke. As a result of a more
rational and thorough exploration of alternatives, the potential
disaster which regional police force amalgamation continues to
represent, might yet be avoided.
Notes
* This article is based upon an earlier paper prepared for Cleveland
Police Authority, May 2006.
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